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flexible, rapidly deployable, and most innovative forces in the Armed Services, yet, a 
clunky and troubled acquisition history has presented obstacles to find emerging, new, 
disruptive concepts that allow us to compete against the world’s Great 
Power Competition. How can we improve warfighter development within NSW 
and create acquisition agility and flexibility? 
The purpose of our project is to analyze Other Transaction Authority (OTA) use 
to procure and develop innovative technology solutions that benefit the warfighter. By 
using Information Warfare Research Project’s (IWRP) OTA consortium, we will act as 
consultants to Naval Special Warfare Command (WARCOM) throughout procurement of 
the Interactive Synthetic Environment (ISE). ISE will act as a case study for this 
acquisition vehicle but will also be analyzed as an innovative prototyping technology in 
NSW. Traditional prototypes help to test and validate the desired warfighter 
capability; however, in many cases, the development of a proper prototype is 
too difficult, expensive, and time consuming. ISE is an emerging technology 
development initiative to produce a Minimal Viable Product (MVP) prototype of a 
virtual environment that can make it possible to collect valuable usage and design data 
to make a go/no-go decision, or to refine a new capability at a fraction of the cost of 
traditional prototypes. 
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Since World War II, Americans have maintained the belief that the U.S. military has 
the best of everything. However, when we look at the world stage today, we see how the 
technological superiority that the U.S. once enjoyed over its competitors has diminished. In 
some areas, the U.S. is already being left behind. In a future with Great Power Competition 
against nations such as China and Russia, there will be a never-ending race for military 
modernization advantages that could tip the existing balance of power to offset American 
strengths and military advantages. One modern example is the development of hypersonic 
missiles. Reports indicate that both China and Russia have conducted several successful tests 
of hypersonic missiles and may potentially field an operational capability ahead of U.S. efforts 
(Sayler, 2019). Other potential areas where the U.S. may fall behind exist in new capabilities 
in the cyber domain, artificial intelligence, and ballistic missiles (Ernst, 2019). “By 2030, 
unless we [U.S. military] pursue ‘urgent change at significant scale,’ as former Defense 
Secretary Gen. James Mattis put it, it’s likely the U.S. will face an enemy with superior 
weapons, superior equipment and superior capabilities” (Inhofe, 2019). How has this 
happened? 
All over the world, the speed of technological development is accelerating, expanding 
access and opportunity to more actors and altering the nature of war (Inhofe, 2019). While 
there are a multitude of reasons for the reduction in U.S. superiority, perhaps one is the way 
that the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) acquires capabilities. This study investigates 
alternative contracting processes in the DOD acquisition process, specifically Other 
Transactional Authorities (OTA), to see if the U.S. can improve the speed at which it acquires 
materials to put us ahead of our competitors once again. Next, we will provide a brief 
introduction to DOD acquisition and highlight some key aspects that we will analyze in our 
paper. 
The U.S. DOD is one of the largest and most complex business organizations in the 
world. It operates thousands of installations worldwide and executes millions of contracts 
each year. Out of the millions of Americans that the DOD employs, tens of thousands of 
military and civilian personnel work to develop, procure, and maintain countless weapons 
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systems and equipment (Fox, 2012, p. 1). It appears that Defense programs are continuing to 
expand, in size, budget, contracting, and purchasing each year. In order to manage such a large 
acquisition organization, robust and detailed regulations have been developed. 
“The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which had its beginnings in the Armed 
Services Procurement Regulation established in 1947, is a substantial and complex set of rules 
governing the federal government’s purchasing process” (Halchin, 2006). The FAR was 
created to enforce rules, regulations and, procedures for government purchases. When 
employees are well educated in these regulations, and programs are run efficiently, the FAR 
should be effective in maintaining a fair, consistent, and fiscally responsible acquisition 
process. 
Bureaucracy, while slow, is employed to provide controls to thwart preventable issues 
and to ensure that American’s tax dollars are spent responsibly and efficiently. However, the 
bureaucratic process within DOD acquisition is not perfect and is full of inefficiencies. 
Defense news reports, congressional hearings, and Government Accountability Office audits 
on the Pentagon’s acquisition process report that the process “consistently yields undesirable 
consequences—cost increases, late deliveries . . . and performance shortfalls” (Costa, 2006, 
p. 13).  
Congress and DOD are constantly working to try and enhance the efficiency of the 
existing acquisition process, especially in an era of explosive technological germination. 
Decades ago, military research and government sponsored science and technology cells, led 
the nation in technology discoveries and created competitive advantages for the U.S. military. 
Today, industry moves at an increasingly rapid pace while continually added layers of 
bureaucracy in the DOD have slowed down the government acquisition loop. As seen in 
Figure 1, the gap between industry and DOD investment in research and development 
continues to widen. The rules of doing business with the federal government are full of 
obstacles and are typically much more restrictive from the commercial arena.  
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Figure 1. Investment Trends in Technology Research and Development. 
Source: Stratton-Feix (2017). 
While the problems with the current acquisition process are apparent in a variety of 
areas, the system is too large and complex to address all the problems at once. This study 
focuses on the contracting portion of the DOD acquisition process with a non-FAR-based 
approach to improve efficiency. This focus area is highlighted within the Defense Acquisition 
Life cycle in Figure 2.  
This paper will be divided into three sections. The first section will scope the problem 
space in a specific community in Special Operations Forces (SOF), called Naval Special 
Warfare (NSW), and discuss the gaps in acquisition contracting. In the following section, we 
will define the OTA contracting process and discuss its application as an alternative 
contracting vehicle. The final section will analyze our application of an OTA in our use case; 
procuring a technological capability called Interactive Synthetic Environment (ISE) at the 




The red box indicates a small portion of the defense acquisition process. The purpose of this study aims to identify, discuss, and provide 
recommendations to optimize the acquisition decisions and activities within this contracting space. Contracting will be discussed in depth 
in subsequent chapters. 
Figure 2. Defense Acquisition Lifecyle. Adapted from Defense Acquisition University (2019).
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II. BACKGROUND 
This paper will provide recommendations to improve the efficiency in the 
acquisition of emerging technology and prototypes within NSW. Specifically, this paper 
will examine the contracting portion of acquisition. We will analyze a use case utilizing a 
non-traditional contracting vehicle called OTA to procure a prototype of a new technology 
capability in NSW. We will discuss our process to provide useful data and 
recommendations for future acquisition decisions and improvement. 
In this chapter we will begin by providing some context about NSW and the SOF 
community. This will provide the reader an overview of SOF, what they do, why it matters, 
how it is changing, and how acquisitions, specifically contracts, relate to special operations 
forces. Then, we will provide a summary of how we recommend improving acquisition in 
NSW using OTAs to support acquisition of new technology.  
A. THE CHALLENGE WITH ACQUISITION PRACTICE TODAY 
In the past, SOF have enjoyed a significant advantage over their adversaries in 
missions such as counter-terrorism. Historically, SOF were sometimes decades ahead of 
their adversaries in the special mission equipment they trained with and utilized on mission, 
giving them a tactical advantage in achieving mission success and mitigating a significant 
amount of risk to their own personnel.  
Today, people around the globe can access and procure cutting edge technology 
with their home computers from commercial vendors and have it on the battlefield in a 
matter of days. Current acquisition practice in NSW, and SOF in general, is not keeping 
pace with the competition in the global marketplace. This is especially apparent in rapid 
employment of novel technology and the procurement and fielding of cutting edge 
equipment. The military created SOF to be a smaller, more flexible force that can be 
adaptable and quickly deployed as first responders in a wide range of military scenarios, 
yet, today they face adversaries who are much more flexible and agile due to the way they 
acquire their capabilities. 
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Adaptation is necessary for SOF to continue to operate in the spirit of its genesis. 
If the DOD does not adapt, America is forfeiting their advantage as a global power and 
opening the door for innovative competitors to assert dominance. If the acquisition process 
that SOF employ do not adapt, SOF may become irrelevant in the future multi-domain 
fight.  
B. INTRODUCTION TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
SOF of the U.S. Armed Forces are organized under United States Special 
Operations Command (SOCOM), the unified combatant command that oversees the 
subordinate Special Operations Component Commands of the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, 
and Air Force. These include the Air Commandos, USMC Raiders, Army Rangers, Green 
Berets, and Navy SEALs; collectively, they are generally considered the nation’s elite 
fighters and tacticians. 
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff identified five current and enduring 
threats in the new National Military Strategy: Violent Extremist Organizations, Russia, 
Iran, North Korea, and China. Special Operations Forces are the main effort in every 
location Al Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are found. From Afghanistan 
to the Middle East, and parts of Africa to include Somalia and Libya, SOF is present to 
disrupt, destroy, and deter these Violent Extremist Organizations. SOCOM plays a critical 
role in the global campaigns but has the fewest number of personnel and consumes a tiny 
amount of the DOD budget. (Thomas, 2017b). 
SOCOM operators are specially trained, often relying on unconventional methods 
and resources, including special equipment, weapons, and tactics in their engagements. 
They are typically deployed in operations against guerillas, insurgents, or irregular forces, 
and are often associated with unconventional warfare and counter-insurgency. A hallmark 
of their effectiveness, and a key driver of their performance, is their agility and 
adaptiveness. They have the ability to deploy and operate on short notice in often novel 
missions.  
This adaptive characteristic relies on an acquisition process that can respond rapidly 
to critical mission requirements today, but also, is visionary and agile in testing and 
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implementing future capabilities and tactics to respond to the unknown conflicts of 
tomorrow. Operators use a wide range of hardware and software, and frequently develop 
urgent needs for new specific capabilities not previously anticipated. They work with a 
variety of systems, all generating a constant flow of demands for new solutions.  
There is a strong do-it-yourself ethos amongst SOF; problem-solving along with 
practical and tactical flexibility are highly valued. This frequently involves reimagining 
existing equipment to meet new or previously unmet needs (Leonard et al., 2018). 
1. How Is SOCOM Changing? 
While we are prepared for continued global counterterrorism operations, 
SOF also executes a variety of critical missions in support of activities to 
counter every threat facing our Nation. The National Security Strategy 
(NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) emphasize the requirement 
to compete with our rivals and recognize that near-peer competition 
reemerged as a central challenge to the U.S. and its interests. SOF is 
uniquely capable of effectively competing below the level of traditional 
armed conflict and across the spectrum of conflict as part of the Joint Force. 
(Thomas, 2017b, p. 3) 
Currently, SOCOM is forcing its organizations to reflect on how they have been 
conducting business to adapt to the current political shifts and global trends. As in any 
transitional period, status quo processes need to be analyzed to ensure that they are 
continuing to support the refined direction of the organization. “To keep pace with the 
accelerating rate of change, let alone get in front of it, we must build agility—both 
operational and institutional - into all that we do” (Thomas, 2017a, p. 14). 
SOCOM and DOD are struggling to adapt their acquisition practices. As industry 
moves faster in developing and fielding novel technology and capability, adversaries are 
gaining an advantage because they are not hampered by bureaucracy in their speed to 
procure and employ new or advanced capabilities ahead of U.S. forces.  
As stated in the 2017 SOCOM Posture Statement before the House Armed Services 
Committee, “in pursuit of increased lethality and other effects we will continue to 
streamline our efforts to rapidly prototype and experiment to field needed capabilities” 
(Thomas, 2017a). Through research and development, SOCOM continues to support agile 
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acquisition through academia, non-traditional partners, and other government 
organizations (Thomas, 2017a). 
2. Naval Special Warfare  
Naval Special Warfare (NSW) is one component of SOCOM composed of about 
10,000 people, consisting of Sea Air, Land (SEAL) and Special Warfare Combatant 
Crewmen (SWCC) operators, as well as the critical enablers that support operations. Their 
mission is to “man, train, equip, educate, deploy, resource, and sustain forces to conduct 
direct action and special reconnaissance, support advise-and-assist programs, and build 
partner capability, in or out of the maritime environment, by employing tailored 
capabilities in support of military commanders, chiefs of mission, interagency, and foreign 
partners and allies” (USSOCOM Office of Communication, 2020). 
Agile acquisitions help NSW fail fast, learn fast, and recover fast, leaving 
acquisition professionals plenty of time, money, and energy to explore new concepts to 
support warfighter development in the 21st century. We are attempting to outline an 
alternative process for acquisition in SOF using a non-FAR based approach to reduce 
traditional barriers in DOD acquisition. We will analyze an OTA, where acquisition is 
supporting procurement and utilization of emerging technology, to procure and develop an 
ISE, a technological MVP that will support acquisition. 
C. NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE ACQUISITION PROCESSES 
Imagine, for example, a SEAL Platoon of 20 warfighters deployed with a 
reconnaissance mission in a politically sensitive, denied environment against a developed 
state adversary. Intelligence within NSW, and across other U.S. Defense agencies indicates 
that the enemy has a new detection system capable of alarming against the insertion of 
SEALS in the water and over land. Due to the risk involved with this mission, 
predominantly due to the existence of this new enemy detection system, the approval of 
the mission is denied or delayed. Since acquisition of counter-system will take longer than 
a year under current FAR acquisition processes, that SEAL platoon and the next SEAL 
platoon relieving them, are unable to operate and support U.S. intelligence requirements.  
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To address this kind of problem, NSW attempts to procure the new detection 
system. If procured, operators would be able to test against this system and learn about its 
vulnerabilities. New technology may be needed in order to defeat the system, or tactics 
may be adjusted to mitigate the probability of detection. Since this is a significant 
intelligence requirement for the U.S., the requirement is validated, and money is allocated 
for procurement. Assuming the acquisition process went smoothly, it took one year to get 
the new system in the hands of NSW tacticians.  
One year after the system is procured, NSW has learned about the complexity of 
the new technology and is able to defeat the detection or reduce enough risk for the mission 
to be approved. However, it has been two years since the initial concept of operation and 
the intelligence environment in this location has changed significantly. The adversary has 
now built up even more robust detection and denial technologies. Missions approvals 
continue to be denied due to these new adversarial technologies and the intelligence gaps 
that exist because of their existence. NSW is unable to operate and the adversary can 
continue to operate and grow in the shadows of U.S. intelligence.  
NSW’s acquisition loop is being outpaced by the adversary and critical operational 
opportunities are missed. NSW was designed to operate in these politically sensitive and 
denied areas, but a slow acquisition loop prevents NSW from procuring new technology. 
This leads to missions not being approved due to high risk, or worse, this endangers the 
lives of U.S. military members who operate in these scenarios. 
All NSW commands are required to check with mandatory sources such as Federal 
Prison Industries, People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled, Defense Logistics Agency, 
and General Service Administration (GSA) before purchasing from the open market. If 
these mandatory sources cannot provide the good or service required, the command is 
authorized to use local vendors such as Home Depot, Staples, etc. They may use one of the 
six prime vendors such as Darley Defense, Atlantic Dive Supply, Quantico Tactical, etc. 
This is where prototype projects such as ISE run into problems and why OTAs are 
authorized by Congress. 
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In Chapter III, we will discuss the specifics of traditional FAR based contracting 
and OTAs.  
D. IMPROVING ACQUISITION IN NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE 
This thesis is attempting to create a template for future acquisition in NSW using a 
non- FAR based approach to reduce traditional barriers in DOD acquisition. We will 
analyze a use case of an OTA being applied to the development and procurement of an 
emerging technology to capture the success or failure of this process and provide 
recommendations for the future acquisition professionals and NSW leadership.  
The big question being examined in this research is how an OTA be used as an 
alternate pathway in acquisition to support NSW units? The OTA is a recently reformed 
contracting process designed to increase acquisition efficiency in emerging technology 
areas. The OTA process is less restrictive than the traditional FAR process and allows for 
increased collaboration and competition amongst industry vendors for desired capabilities 
from the warfighter. OTAs are restricted to specific activities, mainly research, 
development and prototyping (McCormick, 2019). However, the ability to use OTAs to 
support research, development, and prototyping makes them suitable to be used as an 
alternative for innovative technology acquisition supporting special operations forces in 
the DOD.  
As a specific example and use case, this research analyzes the procurement of a 
minimally viable product (MVP) of the interactive synthetic environment for warfighting 
development (ISE) to support acquisition agility within NSW. The desired prototype 
virtual environment (ISE) will make it possible to collect valuable usage and design data 
on current and future capabilities. That data will better support decision-making and 
engineering refinement to capabilities at a fraction of the cost of traditional prototyping. 
E. REVIEW 
In this chapter we introduced U.S. SOF and NSW communities to explain why an 
agile acquisition process is critical to respond to novel mission sets in time sensitive 
situations. The current contracting vehicles used in the NSW acquisition process do not 
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adequately complement effective employment of special operations forces i.e. NSW 
personnel. Great powers, like China and Russia, are encroaching on U.S. military 
supremacy, especially in the areas of new technology and capability development. To 
address this problem, this study focuses on the use of the OTA in DOD acquisition as an 
avenue for improvement in acquisition agility. 
The OTA is a non-traditional contracting process designed to increase acquisition 
efficiency in emerging technology areas. The OTA process is less restrictive than the 
traditional FAR process and allows for increased collaboration and competition amongst 
industry vendors for desired capabilities from the warfighter. This research analyzes a use 
case of an OTA in the development and procurement of an emerging technology prototype, 
ISE, to capture the success or failure of this process and provide recommendations for 
future acquisition professionals and NSW leadership. 
In the next chapter, we will explore and provide an overview of contracting in 
traditional DOD acquisition processes and how it compares with OTAs. We will discuss 
OTAs in detail and why they should be used more frequently within NSW when purchasing 
new prototype technology.  
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III. OTHER TRANSACTION AUTHORITIES 
A. WHAT IS AN OTA?  
“An OTA is a streamlined contracting vehicle that brings innovative research findings 
and state-of-the-art prototypes from industry to the Federal Government. Congress created the 
first OTA as a contractual tool for NASA to acquire and apply breakthrough technologies at 
the advent of the Space Race” (IWRP, 2020). Congress gave the DOD other transaction 
authority in 1990 under 10 U.S.C . § 2371 for research projects. 10 U.S.C. § 2371b (Figure 4)- 
granting authority to use OTAs for prototype projects and follow-on production. For follow-
on production, an OTA can only be used to fund prototype projects that were successfully 
awarded and completed. An item that was initially funded using an OTA should be added to a 
future planning budget. 
“OTAs enable fast acquisition of critically needed technologies in areas as diverse as 
armaments, satellites, medical devices, and electromagnetic spectrum technologies” (J. 
Fickling, PowerPoint Slides, June 16, 2020). OTAs are awarded faster than FAR based 
contracts, have far fewer barriers to competition, and utilize consortiums to help the end user 
think outside of their box. Consortiums, (i.e., organizations of several businesses joining 
together as a group for a shared purpose) are used in OTAs. If you have a prototype in mind, 
but have no idea how to create the product, a consortium is the perfect place to get assistance. 
A consortium allows the military or government agency to state a requirement or problem they 
are trying to solve and allows for traditional and non-traditional defense contractors to submit 
white papers describing their ideas on how to tackle the challenge for consideration. Nonprofit 
organizations, academic institutions and defense contractors typically make up a consortium 
(Peters, 2019). The outside management a consortium offers a large amount of flexibility and 
efficiency to the OTA process. Whereas the process to secure standard government contracts 
can be incredibly lengthy, the duration from releasing of a white paper to issuing an award 
through a consortium could be little as ten weeks. The case study described in this paper 
utilized Information Warfare Research Project (IWRP) to facilitate the use of the OTA in 
developing and procuring ISE. The A in OTA often stands for Agreement. Since an OTA is 
not regulated by the FAR, it is not considered a contract. Another way to look at an OTA is to 
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think about two parties trying to reach the same end goal. One of those parties is going to pay 
for a good or service and the other party receives money in exchange for providing a good or 
service. Most of the DOD and several government agencies have adopted the use of OTAs for 
research and development and prototype activities (Reynolds & Angle, 2018). 
There has been a broad increase in DOD OTA obligations in the last five years as seen 
in Figure 3. “In total, DOD OTA obligations have increased 352 percent over the last three 
years,” and this trend suggests future growth across all joint services (McCormick, 2019). 
While other services, most notably the Army, have substantially increased the usage of OTAs, 
the Navy has been the laggard, accounting “for less than one percent of the defense total 
defense obligation between FY 2015 and FY 2017” (McCormick, 2019). While initial OTA 
usage in the Navy was limited, more recently, it seems that the Navy is starting to catch on to 
the trend, spending $24.96 million in OTA in FY 2018, compared to the $7.3 million combined 
total from FY 2015 to FY 2017 (McCormick, 2019). 
 
Figure 3. Defense OTA Obligations by Customer, 2014–2018. Source: 
McCormick (2019). 
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B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOW FOR ISE 
The WARCOM N87 Director of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), first reached out to 
NIWC in early June 2020 with a specific interest in IWRP’s Consortium. After a few weeks 
of emailing NIWC back-and-forth, we connected with a representative from NIWC Atlantic. 
They became our primary point of contact and entry point for the Consortium/OTA process. 
WARCOM gave the NSW students at NPS permission to act as consultants on their behalf to 
develop ISE using an OTA contracting vehicle. By the middle of August 2020, we began 
working with IWRP representatives to generate a SOW for the desired ISE capability.  
The generation of the SOW was completed by leveraging a variety of sources including 
acquisition documents from a similar capability as well as input from a vendor. An NPS 
Provost brought one company to NPS in November 2019 for an unrelated technology 
demonstration. NPS leadership were working with several companies to foster relationships 
between industry and academia. Representatives from this company informally met NSW 
representatives working at NPS and initially began discussion about potential avenues for 
partnership. Over time, this morphed into back-and-forth correspondence between NSW 
academia representatives at NPS, and this company. Some of the initial brainstorming sessions 
between these stakeholders helped shape the SOW as the scope of work was refined. In 
addition to the influence from industry, we also leveraged the SOW from a previous Marine 
Corps contract for a similar capability. Both sources helped jumpstart SOW development. The 
SOW can be viewed in Appendix C. 
The IWRP consortium seemed like a perfect fit for our project since it brought together 
NPS students and faculty, WARCOM government contractors, and industry professionals. 
NIWC has access to the IWRP consortium that supports research, development, and 
prototyping. IWRP uses a company called Advanced Technology International who is an OTA 
Consortia management firm. This firm manages eight different government consortiums such 
as undersea technology, countering weapons of mass destruction, and aviation and missile 
technology.  
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C. Why OTAs ARE PREFERRED 
Unlike the traditional FAR contracting process, OTAs use the consortium which 
allows government and industry to communicate more openly. It was highly encouraged by 
IWRP personnel to interact with the various vendors throughout the OTA process. Once the 
white papers had been released, our team reached out to several vendors to establish 
communication with the ones we liked the best. In chapter 4, we go more into the vendor 
interactions and product demonstrations. We were able to have free and open discussions with 
as many or little vendors as we choose. The only topic we were told to stay away from was 
budget. IWRP personnel repeated several times that the benefit of the consortium was being 
able to balance cost with the technical aspect. Both cost and technical performance needed to 
be equally weighed. 
OTAs were created to allow the DOD and other government agencies to bypass certain 
procurement regulations by allowing them to be more innovative. An OTA can allow for 
“much greater speed, flexibility, and accessibility in performing research and prototyping 
activities” (Stevens, 2020). The government is notorious for purchasing services and supplies 
that are “good, fast, and/or cheap.” Going with the lowest bidder or cheapest price is not always 
the best solution. Contracting officers review the RFP and choose the best vendor usually based 
on price and availability of the item or service. The SME requesting the item or service does 
not have the ability to interact with the vendor once the RFP’s have been submitted. In the past, 
we have seen both East and West Coast NSW commands included on the same contract to try 
and save time and money. For example, one of the commands SME’s had submitted a sole 
source justification because their equipment requires certain certifications that the other 
commands do not have. The contracting officer failed to take into consideration the 
requirement for different certifications needed for maintenance and relied on one contract for 
both East and West coast commands. As a result, the vendor who was awarded the contract, 
did not have the proper certifications to conduct maintenance on one of the commands 
equipment. By choosing the cheapest source and the not allowing the SME to interact with the 
vendor, the contract was only in effect for two of the three commands. 
OTAs are more flexible than traditional contracting methods. Since OTAs are not a 
contract, both parties can make sure the good or service being developed caters to the unique 
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characteristics of the program and the requirements of the end users.). “OTAs also can free up 
government procurement personnel, particularly when contractors are selected to run 
consortiums whose members compete for OTAs. In these situations, the government will 
announce its interest in receiving from consortium members white papers that address a 
particular topic or problem, and based on these papers, the contractor or agency may select a 
number of consortium members to submit more formal proposals, followed by a further down 
select process” (Reynolds & Peters, 2018). 
There will always be risks involved using an OTA for prototypes. “A prototype project 
is used to evaluate the technical or manufacturing feasibility or military utility of a particular 
technology, process, concept, end item, effect or other discrete feature” (J. Fickling, 
PowerPoint slide, June 16, 2020). Similar to a copyright, if nobody has developed your idea, 
you can consider it a prototype and do an OTA through a consortium. The FAR was written to 
protect the government and taxpayer interests and people might wonder if money is being 
wasted on a new prototype. On the other hand, in the private sector, companies often develop 
technology much faster than the government due to the lack of regulations. For example, the 
TALOS project, the development of an exoskeleton suit to be worn by special operators, was 
intended to be outsourced through a consortium type forum where the private sector could offer 
ideas and solutions for a future battlefield concept. The TALOS suit looked similar to the suit 
worn on the popular XBOX video game HALO. The acquisition idea was taken from the Red 
Bull Stratos project (Red Bull, n.d.) where Austrian skydiver Felix Baumgartner jumped out 
of a helium balloon from space to Earth. The project took approximately two years from start 
to finish. If the government had done this project, Mr. Baumgartner would have passed away 
before completing his mission. 
D. OTA PURPOSES 
The federal government allows OTAs to be used for the following: research, prototype, 
or contract for follow-on production. For ISE, we fell under prototype since we were creating, 
designing, and developing technology for defense purposes. Other military units have used 
modeling and simulation in the past, but none of them shared the same criteria as ours. By 
building ISE, we will be able to use students at NPS to test and evaluate different prototype 
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unmanned aerial systems (UAS). ISE is also envisioned for use as a training tool to teach 
students how to fly UAS’s. The increased use of UAS on the battlefield are hypothesized to 
allow more freedom of movement in and around the battlefield for U.S. forces. 
Table 1 describes how OTAs can only be used for prototype if one of the following 
applies. 




Figure 4. Non-FAR versus Traditional FAR-Based Contracting. 
Source: Bold (2019). 
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E. FAR-BASED CONTRACTING 
1. Contracting Overview 
“The vision for the Federal Acquisition System is to deliver, on a timely basis, the 
best value product or service to the customer, while maintaining the public’s trust and 
fulfilling public policy objectives” (FAR 1.102(a)). “The procurement process is defined as 
the processes required to acquire goods and services from outside the performing 
organization” (AcqNotes, 2019). The DOD has three processes: The Defense Acquisition 
Process, the Joint Capability Integration Development System (JCIDS), and Planning, 
Program, Budget, and Execution (PPB&E) process. When procuring goods and services for 
the DOD, it is the buyer’s job to make sure they are being good stewards of taxpayer dollars. 
Buyer’s must make sure they are only purchasing the amount needed for a specific 
requirement and at a fair price. Procurement for the DOD uses a binding contract whether it’s 
a government credit card, OTA, or a FAR regulated contract (AcqNotes, 2019). 
Generally, the current NSW contracting timeline can be very lengthy. First, the 
Requirements Department (N8) must validate a requirement for the good or service. This is 
done by holding review boards to vote on the good or service, make sure there isn’t a 
conflicting contract already in place, and that the commodity can legally be purchased. The 
N8 is responsible for bridging the gap between the SEAL Teams and WARCOM. Made up 
of active duty, government employees, and contractors, the N8 is broken into several 
commodities such as Visual Augmentation Systems (VAS), UAS, and communications. 
Once a requirement has been generated, the customer needs to generate a Request for 
Proposal (RFP), then a Statement of Work (SOW) and possibly a Sole Source Justification. 
Once all the documents have been filled out, they are sent to Contracting Office and reviewed. 
Next the Contracting Office begins Market Research and looking into the possible vendors to 
fulfill the contract. During the Market Research phase, the customer has little to no interaction 
with possible vendors. According to the Force Logistics Manual, “the commands Judge 
Advocate General should be notified in advance and in writing of the date, location, and 
subject of any formal or informal briefing to government personnel by representatives of 
industry for the purpose of providing information on proposed services, commercial materiel, 
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research areas, research descriptions, proposed exploration, or technical inquiries” (Naval 
Special Warfare Command [NSWC], 2017, para 5500.a). The Contracting Officer is also the 
person who awards a contract to a specific vendor. The customer is typically not involved in 
awarding a contract unless a sole source justification is used and those are not always 
guaranteed. 
The Logistics Department (N4) is responsible for submitting contracts to the 
contracting office. The N4 is made up of Supply Officers, Civil Engineering Officers, Logistic 
Specialists, Seabees, and Gunnersmates. They are not provided much training in contracting 
before coming to a command and the process can seem a bit overwhelming at times. It is 
important for the N4 to fully understand the requirement before submitting any documents to 
contracting. Most end users do not have knowledge of acquisitions or constraints in the 
contracting process and can become frustrated. The N4 acts as a liaison between the command 
and the contracting office. This lack of interaction and understanding of different departments 
and processes, is often a point of friction in the acquisition process between warfighters and 
acquisition professionals.  
In NSW, a typical example for procuring a new capability may look like this. An 
acquisition professional representing a SEAL Team meets a vendor at a SOCOM approved 
trade show. The vendor demonstrates a new technology on how to counter a UAS threat. This 
capability is believed to be required by NSW to carry out missions. Since this is a new 
prototype technology, mandatory sources cannot be utilized. The N4 on a SEAL Team takes 
the requirement to the N8 at Naval Special Warfare Group ONE or TWO and submits the 
required acquisition documents to the contracting office. These documents include 
justification for the requirement as well as detailed information that defines the capability. 
The N4, with support from the N8 and Operations Department (N3), fill out the SOW, RFP, 
and sole source justification. The N3 is required to validate the impact to the Team’s mission 
with or without the good or service. 
The N4 submits the documents to the contracting office. Usually a week, or more, will 
transpire before the contracting office sends the documents back to the N4 with feedback and 
errors that need to be fixed before resubmission. After a multi-departmental coordination 
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effort, between the N4, N8, N3, and the contracting office, documents are fixed and 
resubmitted.  
Once the contracting office has the required paperwork needed, departments are 
forbidden to communicate with a vendor in fear of unauthorized commitments. People 
without the proper training, may give information to a vendor giving them an unfair advantage 
to other vendors competing for award. The contracting office also does not want anyone 
negotiating the terms of the contract committing the government to accept pricing and 
delivery “In accordance with FAR 1.602-3, it is illegal for personnel without contracting 
authority (i.e., warranted contracting officer or warranted government purchase cardholder) 
to order supplies or services, change the terms of existing purchase(s), or commit the 
government to pay a vendor for any supplies or services. An unauthorized commitment is not 
binding solely because the government representative who made it lacked the authority to 
enter that agreement on behalf of the Government” (NSWC, 2017, para 5400).  
Several months may go by without any status from the contracting office. The vendor 
may send correspondence to acquisition professionals from NSW asking if they are still 
interested in the product. The vendor may also communicate that they have made 
improvements to the original system that was shown over six months ago. Not being able to 
interact with the vendor or help conduct market research makes the N4, N8, and N3 unable to 
provide feedback to the vendor and makes them less influential in shaping the development 
of this new technology for NSW use. 
The result of the process described above is that when a contract is finally awarded, a 
year may have gone by since the initial demonstration at the trade show. During this year, 
there has been almost no interaction between the vendor, the end user, the operations 
department, or other NSW acquisition professionals. During that year, newer technology may 
have rendered the original capability less effective or obsolete. In addition, adversaries that 
are not constrained by this contracting process may have already purchased this technology, 
improved upon it, and begun using it on the battlefield against American military forces. 
Acquisition is a significant bottleneck in the U.S. contracting process that impedes NSW in 
their ability to be responsive with new technologies in missions against a nimbler adversary. 
Now we will outline our process for helping to close this observed gap. 
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2. FAR Based Contracting Methods 
There are several types of FAR-Based contracting methods, to include fixed price, 
cost reimbursement, and indefinite-delivery-indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contracts (Figure 
4). A contract is an agreement between two or more parties. It must contain: Offer, 
Acceptance, Consideration, Legal, and Competent Parties. Fixed price contracts are used 
when risk of performance is low (e.g., purchasing technology that is mature, proven 
processes, commercial off the shelf items, etc.). The contractor is obligated to deliver the 
requirement called for by the contract at a fixed price. A contractor will receive no more 
than the agreed amount, regardless of actual costs incurred. The amount of profit warned 
is dependent on the contractor’s costs incurred. Cost savings become profit while cost 
overrun reduces profit or increases loss. 
Cost reimbursable contracts are used when the risk of performance is high (e.g., 
cutting edge technology, unproven processes, untried materials, etc.). The government is 
obligated to reimburse the contractor for all allowable, reasonable, and allocable cost 
incurred, and to pay a fee in accordance with the contract terms. The contractor agrees to 
provide “Best Effort,” which could result in delivery of nothing and the contractor is not 
held accountable. Any cost savings is returned to the government and any cost overrun is 
paid for by the government.  
IDIQ or blanket purchase agreements are used when you are going to purchase 
several goods or services from a vendor but do not have a specified quantity of time of 
need. Basic Underwater Demolition School (BUD/s) used to have an IDIQ with Darley 
Defense and Drager for buying replacement parts for dive equipment. Drager had very long 
lead times for all the replacement parts for the Mark 25 dive rig and the IDIQ created a 
demand for the parts so they could be ordered when needed. 
3. Contracting Steps to Award 
The following steps are involved in putting a FAR based contract into place through 
its eventual close-out. See Figure 5. This can all happen in a span of days of over many 
years, depending upon the size and scope of the procurement action. 
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Figure 5. Traditional FAR Based Contracting Process. Source: Mortlock 
(2019). 
a. Procurement Planning 
During a lecture on procurement planning, Dr. Mortlock (2019) listed the following 
government’s considerations  
• Whether to procure (outsource decision) 
• How to procure (procurement method and contract type: Fixed or Cost 
Reimbursement) 
• What to procure (products and services needed) 
• How much to procure (quantity desired) 
• When to procure (delivery schedule) (B. Mortlock, PowerPoint slides, 
October 17, 2019) 
There are two different procurement methods, competitive and noncompetitive. 
Competitive allows for full and open competition. With this type of procurement method, 
a contract is usually awarded to the lowest priced bidder that meets all technical 
requirements. Noncompetitive methods of procurement are sole-source negotiations 
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meaning one specific vendor is requested to provide the product or service and requires 
approval. Dr. Mortlock (2019) covered seven exceptions to the full and op competition rule 
in accordance with FAR:  
1. Only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy 
agency requirements.  
2. Unusual and compelling urgency 
3. Industrial mobilization; engineering, or research capability; or expert 
services 
4. International agreement 
5. Authorized or required by statue 
6. National security 
7. Public interest (B. Mortlock, PowerPoint slides, October 17, 2019) 
b. Solicitation Planning 
During the Solicitation Planning phase, the product/project requirements are fully 
documented, and potential sources are identified. The requirement must be stated in terms 
of mission need and minimum operational performance. In stating our needs to vendors, 
we try to be as vague as possible to allow for the maximum amount of creativity. We 
communicate in terms of performance rather than specifications and we never discuss 
budget. Evaluation factors must be developed in order to set priorities in general order of 
importance. For example: technical performance, past performance, cost, supportability, 
producibility, and management approach.  
A Contracting Officer must conduct market research during this phase. Market 
Surveillance is conducted by attending trade shows, viewing research reports, reading trade 
journals and from symposia proceedings. Market Investigation involves collecting, 
evaluating & analyzing specific information needs to meet agency needs, identify potential 
sources, survey manufacturers, and analyze responses. If product or service is available, 
they can proceed with a commercial off the shelf buy. If the product or service is not 
available via commercial sources, a requirement or new development must be generated. 
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A RFP is generated and sent out to all potential vendors. A RFP must include what 
the system must do/service must accomplish; essential elements & characteristics; 
verification criteria and methodologies; and SOW. 
The purpose of a SOW is to establish and define in clear, understandable terms 
what the contractor must do and what goods are to be provided or what services are to be 
performed for the contractor to be paid. A SOW facilitates contractor understanding and 
improves contractor proposal; helpful in data call, proposal evaluation and source selection, 
and provides a standard for contractor performance.  
c. Solicitation 
DOD “solicits” potential contractors to submit bids or proposals for required 
equipment and services using two basic methods, invitation for bid and RFP. An invitation 
for bid is more typical for fixed price production contracts for items such as repair parts. 
Discussions with bidders is prohibited and more than one bidder is expected. RFP’s are 
typically used for R&D, cost-reimbursable type contracts. The solicitation process requires 
formal, public advertisement on sites such as FedBizOps and GSA.  
d. OTA Solicitation 
We solicited our OTA through a request for white papers, in which the solicitation 
will state all evaluation factors and information. This allows the government to solicit 
information on potential pricing and prototyping within the scope of a particular project. 
Vendor must join a particular consortium in order to submit white papers and be in 
competition for an OTA award. “On the other hand, a board could issue a Broad Agency 
Announcement. Such an announcement will likely be general in nature and identify the 
areas of interest for a particular prototype. This allows the government to seek information 
from all parties who may be capable of satisfying its needs” (Peters, 2019). 
e. Source Selection 
This is a formal, structured process for evaluation proposals and selecting “Best 
Value” offers. It is the job of the Contracting Officer to make sure the best value good or 
service is going to be procured by the government. Best Value means the most 
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advantageous tradeoff between price and performance for the government. It is designed 
to prevent bias and ensures a “level playing field” for all offerors. The Source Selection 
Plan (SSP) must be prepared once a decision has been made to follow formal source 
selection procedures. It is a major document prepared in the solicitation process and 
approved prior to RFP release (B. Mortlock, PowerPoint slides, October 17, 2019). The 
Contracting Officer also debriefs unsuccessful offerors and lets them know why they were 
not selected. In chapter four, we will discuss the feedback report process used with the 
consortium. 
f. Contract Administration 
During the last phase of the contracting process, the Contracting Officer 
Representative (COR) will monitor the contract’s performance. A COR is in charge of 
managing the contract once it has been awarded. If the COR does not see a reason for the 
contract to continue, it may be terminated. There are two kinds of contract termination. 
Termination for Convenience, a sovereign right of the government, is not at all typical for 
private industry. Termination costs can be charged against the government if they were 
lawfully incurred by the terminated contractor. Termination for Default is when there has 
been a real deficiency in performance. This may happen is the contractor fails to make 
timely delivery, perform any contract provision, or make satisfactory progress thus 
endangering performance.  
In March 2020, a group of NPS students, advisors, professors, and members of 
WARCOM discussed the game plan for ISE. Since NPS is an academic organization, 
collaboration with private companies is quite common. Companies donate money to NPS 
and in exchange, receive research done by students on various projects. One of the 
companies we started working with had software developers and designers that drew up a 
model of what Ise should look like. Getting the project on contract was our biggest concern. 
In Chapter IV, we talk about how we used the IRWP Consortium to solicit a vendor to 
fulfill our requirement. 
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F. REVIEW 
This chapter defined and discussed important features about the OTA contracting 
process and how this differs from traditional FAR contracting in the DOD. Our research 
concluded that there are many advantages in using a consortium for an OTA. IWRP 
conducted market research and found vendors that were interest in our SOW. Vendors 
work with IWRP in submitting all white papers and full proposals. All we had to do was 
talk to various vendors, answer questions and give feedback on the IWRP portal. We, the 
end users, were encouraged to talk to the vendors as much as possible. This is frowned 
upon in the FAR contract environment. The end user deals with the contracting office and 
isn’t allowed to speak the vendors about job or product specifics. Hopefully NSW starts 
using OTAs more often for prototypes and new technology requirements. 
The next chapter will discuss how we used an OTA in our case study for 
WARCOM. We will explain our case study and why we chose to apply OTA contracting 
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IV. ISE TEST CASE 
Our application of OTA contracting is in support of the procurement of 
technological capability, called ISE, at WARCOM. This chapter will discuss the concept 
of ISE and explain why we decided to use this as our test case. We will provide information 
about related work in synthetic prototyping and virtual environments and discuss how it 
has been used to benefit both industry and DOD in acquisition. 
A. THE ISE TEST CASE 
The NSW headquarters, WARCOM, has a particular department assigned to 
combat development and the management of existing programs that the community 
benefits from. One specific focus area in this department is the management of NSW UAS. 
These are various sized aerial drones that can have autonomous or remote-controlled 
capability to support Navy SEALs operating on the ground.  
One specific UAS, called the ScanEagle, was developed by a subsidiary of Boeing 
to be a small, long-endurance, low-altitude aerial platform that is used for intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance. Like many other military systems, this UAS was 
originally developed by industry for non-military application and later adapted to the needs 
of the warfighter. The ScanEagle UAS program continues to be managed by acquisition 
professionals at WARCOM. Emerging technology that can be incorporated into the 
ScanEagle and new employment ideas for NSW to utilize this system, all provide the 
impetus for evolution of this existing capability. WARCOM is currently working towards 
the next generation of this capability. 
The authors are working in collaboration with WARCOM as consultants for the 
development of the next generation ScanEagle. Our team is composed of SEALs, NSW 
supply, and WARCOM civilian acquisition professionals. The goal for our team is to utilize 
the reformed contracting process of an OTA and analyze potential increases in acquisition 
efficiency using this process. The OTA process should enable us to pursue development of 
ISE, an emerging technology capability that can aid in cost-effective system design and 
testing of desired capabilities for the warfighter. ISE will provide WARCOM with a new 
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tool that can aid in the development of the next generation ScanEagle, and we hope, future 
systems that WARCOM intends to explore. 
The concept of ISE, which is a physics-based simulation environment, has already 
been proven to be an effective tool in aiding system design. In addition, ISE may be used 
as an alternative to some of the expensive and resource heavy tasks in physical prototype 
creation and operational testing. This specific area of the acquisition cycle has been 
highlighted in Figure 6. There has been ISE related work within the DOD as well as in 
industry. In the next section we will discuss some of these efforts and explain some of the 
potential benefits of the envisioned ISE prototype.  
 
The red box shows the portion of the acquisition process where ISE would be utilized for virtual 
system design and refinement. An ISE tool provides timeline and cost reduction specifically in this 
phase of the acquisition process. 
Figure 6. Major Capability Acquisition Process. 
Adapted from Acq Notes (2020). 
B. SYNTHETIC PROTOTYPING RELATED WORK 
The use of simulation and virtual environments in the acquisition process is not a 
new concept. There have been multiple initiatives to leverage virtual simulation and 
modeling to increase efficiency in system design, testing, and evaluation. Some of these 
initiatives have proven successful in theory but have not proven beneficial in execution; 
while other initiatives have disrupted traditional acquisition practices and led to new and 
improved operating procedures. In DOD, as well as in industry, it is important to 
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understand the benefits and limitations of using a virtual environment simulation tool 
effectively.  
1. Synthetic Prototyping Success Outside of DOD 
One such success in commercial industry is with Boeing’s 777 airframe. Like many 
programs in DOD, the Boeing 777 is a complex and expensive mobility platform where 
performance and safety are critical. The development of the 777 marked a new strategy in 
how Boeing designed and developed new airframes, with a much greater extent on 
modeling and simulation for virtual prototypes. “When the Boeing 777 entered service in 
1995, it dramatically advanced the state of the art by being the first airplane ever to be 100 
percent digitally designed in three dimensions using computers” (Spenser, 2009). 
According to information from the July 2009 Boeing Frontiers Magazine, written 
by Jay Spenser, compared with traditional, physical mockup design techniques that were 
used for the Boeing 757 and 767 designs, the virtual process used in the Boeing 777 led to 
several design efficiencies. These include: 
• Elimination of more than 3000 assembly interfaces  
• 90% reduction in engineering change requests (6000 to 600)  
• 50% reduction cycle time for engineering change request  
• 90% reduction in material rework  
• 50x improvement in assembly tolerances for fuselage (Spenser, 2009) 
The use of virtual prototyping was an enormous success for Boeing. The heavy 
reliance on modeling and simulation was used throughout the entire development and 
fielding process. From product proposal, product design, modeling the factory 
environments, testing the system, modeling variant and enhancements, and even to train 
pilots and maintainers. The use of this technology helped aid decision makers in avoiding 
risk and maximizing value in practically every stage of the airframe’s development to 
ensure timeliness of schedule, cost-effectiveness, and quality performance that meets the 
desired needs of the company and customer (Spenser, 2009).  
2. Synthetic Prototyping in DOD 
Early Synthetic Prototyping (ESP) and Simulation-Based Acquisition (SBA) are 
two concepts that the DOD has explored to aid acquisition. The two concepts are similar 
32 
in theory and leverage virtual prototyping and testing rather than costly physical mock-ups 
and live testing. ESP and SBA differ in how and where they are applied in the acquisition 
process. These differences are shown visually in Figure 7.  
 
ESP (orange box) targets change early in the acquisition process when cost is low and 
SBA (green box) attempts to address the entire life cycle. 
Figure 7. ESP and SBA in the Acquisition Process. 
Adapted from Murray et al. (2014). 
SBA attempted to address the entire life cycle from idea generation and concept 
evaluation through fielding and employment. Despite interest in the concept, SBA failed to 
achieve success with that large of a range in the acquisition process. Part of the reason for its 
failure was that the use of simulation at each phase of the acquisition process differs. Unlike 
SBA, ESP addresses the unique needs only in the early phases, pre-milestone A, when change 
is typically much cheaper than later in subsequent milestones. This idea focuses on early 
concept development when costs are relatively low, and it is easier to make changes and shape 
major design decisions. These lessons helped aid DOD’s understanding of how best to utilize 
synthetic prototyping and virtual environments in the acquisition process. 
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ESP also has desired use in aiding source selection in competitive prototyping. 
Competitive prototyping incentivizes “vendors to provide innovative solutions and ensure 
acquisition dollars are spent toward development and evaluation of a production solution” that 
meets the warfighters needs (Smith & Vogt, 2017). Traditionally, high costs are associated 
with competitive prototyping to include multiple full-scale mockups for evaluation against 
alternative options. Not only is there cost associated with the prototype manufacturing, but 
there is commonly travel cost, venue cost, time cost, and manpower costs associated with the 
evaluation. The cost and time savings between traditional and simulation driven processes can 
be seen visually in Figure 8. 
 
“It is important to note that physical and virtual prototyping are not two competing technologies; they are 
complementary. It is not recommended to try and entirely eliminate physical prototyping from the design 
process, but instead, integrate virtual prototyping and simulation at appropriate development stages” where 
physical prototypes and field testing have particular weaknesses and limitations (Churazova, 2020). 
Figure 8. Virtual Prototyping versus Physical Prototyping Process. Source: 
Force Technology (n.d.). 
By implementing a virtual environment for prototyping, in this study ISE, NSW 
can develop a UAS system that meets its requirements prior to material development of the 
physical system ESP can be very beneficial to the government by lowering costs in the 
long run. It can be used in testing all types of prototype vehicles in the DOD without having 
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to spend millions in actual production. ISE will allow us to create a “virtual environment 
before a physical prototype is produced. The ability to refine requirements facilitates pre-
milestone A concept refinement and supports acquisition process improvement and 
agility.” (Murray et al., 2014). 
“To facilitate the evaluation of trades between capabilities and resources, tools are 
required to visualize information” (Smith & Vogt, 2017). This is where a robust, physics-
based, virtual world is essential to provide rapid exploration of engineering design tradeoffs 
in an operationally representative environment. See Figure 9. Performance parameters, 
system attributes, reliability, and employment of a system can be explored in this 
comprehensive virtual environment.  
 
Figure 9. Physics-Based Digital Warfighting Connection to Tradespace 
Decision Tools. Source: Smith and Vogt (2017). 
ESP creates a digital operational assessment loop, linking warfighter to system 
engineers and acquisition developers. In many ways, ESP is a communication tool that 
provides measurable data, in a meaningful way, to a variety of stakeholders in the 
acquisition process. 
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The next section describes one specific Army initiative to use ESP in a crowd-
sourced gaming environment called Operation Overmatch. 
3. Operation Overmatch 
Through a collaborative effort between Army Capabilities Integration Center and 
the Army Game Studio, a gaming environment, within the ESP effort, was created to test 
technology and tactics. This project, named Operation Overmatch, intended “to connect 
soldiers with concept and capability developers, scientists, and engineers across the Army” 
(Robinson, 2017). This put the warfighter at the center of the acquisition feedback loop as 
depicted pictorially in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10. Early Synthetic Prototyping Enables Soldiers and Engineers to 
Co-Develop Solutions. Source: Smith and Vogt (2017). 
The basic idea was to crowd source data in a virtual environment from many 
military operators to inform future capabilities and tactics. “ESP facilitates the 
development of an unbounded number of design options in the concept phase. Those 
options are tested and assessed as virtual prototypes in a game network. Warfighter players 
‘play’ the virtual systems while analysts gather data via game analytics to identify what 
works and what does not” (Murray et al., 2014, p. 3). 
There are many challenging questions when dealing with the data analytics for this 
initiative. Some still have not yet been addressed. The goal is that the data from gameplay 
would be “logged, sorted, and then analyzed, using insights from sports and commercial 
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video games” (Dobkin, 2017). The developers hoped this data would “inform the Army’s 
decisions about which technologies to purchase and how to develop tactics using them, all 
with the aim of building a more forward-thinking, prepared force” (Dobkin, 2017). 
Many past initiatives in ESP efforts from the DOD have become stagnant due to a 
range of factors including lack of consistent funding and support, data mining and analytics 
challenges, and difficulties in inspiring sufficient amount of end users to make crowd 
sourcing valuable. However, there is still significant interest in leveraging technology 
advances in virtual simulations and ESP in a proven system in the DOD. The theoretical 
and practical value of this concept has already been proved outside of DOD in the 
commercial arena (e.g. Boeing 777). 
C. REVIEW 
There has been related work, inside and outside of DOD, proving the benefits of 
virtual environments in acquisition. Developing an ISE tool for NSW would complement 
existing development and testing practices, driving down cost and saving time early in the 
acquisition process. ISE would improve the connection of warfighters into the acquisition 
process by connecting them with engineers and acquisition professionals in a more 
meaningful way. This loop of virtual data capture, feedback, and system refinement will 
drive higher customer satisfaction as well as greater efficiency in resource allocation in the 
acquisition of future capability. In the next chapter, we will chronologically discuss the 
steps that our team has taken using an OTA in support of our ISE test case.  
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V. ISE DEVELOPMENT METHODOLOGY 
The ISE development methodology chapter will provide a detailed explanation of 
the stakeholders involved and data to quantify the vendor space and our interactions 
throughout the OTA contracting process. 
A. IWRP VIRTUAL INDUSTRY DAY 
NAVWAR and the IWRP Consortium Manager worked with FedBizOps.gov, a 
website for finding government RFP’s, and the Consortium website to advertise the ISE 
requirement as well as other government-initiated problem statements from other agencies. 
IWRP coordinated a virtual industry day where all the consortium members would brief 
respective problem statements to potential vendors. The IWRP manager gave online 
training a week prior to industry day to go over what to expect and things we are and are 
not allowed to talk with vendors about. We were told to generate a quad slide (see Figure 
11) that would be briefed and distributed to the entire consortium.  
After IWRP made the opening remarks on industry day, the consortium manager 
turned the floor over to the four military units to brief their concepts to the vendors. Each 
unit briefed for approximately 15 minutes and was followed by a question-and-answer 
session. Vendors had to submit their questions to a moderator in order to remain 
anonymous. During industry day, NSW representatives briefed approximately 40 vendors 
with background information, top level requirements, scope of work, and key milestones 
for the development of ISE. Immediately preceding the presentation, vendors had a chance 
to ask questions in front of the entire group.  
Once all the industry day briefs were finished, we hosted nine 30-minute phone 
calls with potential vendors. Vendors had to sign up for these calls through the consortium 
a week in advance. These calls were used for the vendors to ask amplifying questions 
pertaining to our statement of work and brief. Each of the vendor phone calls were 
different. Some calls started with the vendor telling us who they were, what they have done 
in relation to our scope of work, and what their strengths were. Other companies spent the 
entire 30 minutes posing questions to further clarify the desired capability. Some examples 
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of questions that were asked include: “why do we need to be able to see the UAS from a 
3rd person,” “are we looking for an Xbox or PlayStation console vs a PC,” “how many 
users at one time will be playing the game,” “are we looking for wargaming or augmented 
reality virtual reality,” etc. 
 
Figure 11. ISE for Warfighting Development Slide from Industry Day 
The next three weeks after the virtual industry day, we received emails and phone 
calls from eleven vendors expressing interest in subsequent meetings and expressing 
willingness to respond with initial proposals. 
B. WHITE PAPER SOLICITATIONS 
White papers are used to explain new technology or products that are being 
developed. They are similar to a proposal but go into more detail about how the technology 
39 
or product is supposed to work. It took thirty-three days after the IWRP Virtual Industry 
Day to receive White Papers from eleven potential vendors. A brief description of the 
eleven companies are included in Appendix D. We read through all solicitations and began 
sorting vendors that appropriately responded to fit our scope of work and the vendors that 
were lacking in response. IWRP uses a portal that allows project leaders to provide 
feedback to the various vendors regarding the White Papers. During the feedback process, 
we were allowed full interaction with the vendors to ask questions or give comments in 
response to their submitted White Papers. In FAR based contracts, we, the end users, would 
not be allowed to reach out to the vendors after a formal request had been made.  
After reading all the White Papers, we had to log onto the IWRP portal and indicate 
whether the vendor is RED or GREEN. RED indicates weakness or risk in the vendors 
proposal, and GREEN indicates that a vendor is invited to submit a Full Proposal. For RED 
vendors, a detailed write up was required to explain weaknesses in initial proposals. This 
process is helpful towards the vendor and the government by allowing the vendor to see 
where they missed the mark, how to do better next time, or gives them a clearer picture of 
what to include for a Full Proposal, should they choose to submit one. From the 
government’s point of view, it may reduce risk by telling a vendor there is no interest in 
their proposal. For GREEN vendors, feedback was also required so that companies could 
refine proposals for the final submission. In addition to the qualitative feedback that we 
provided in response to each proposal, we generated a rubric to quantitatively rate each 
vendor. 
C. WHITE PAPER EVALUATION CRITERIA 
We developed an evaluation rubric to objectively assess vendors’ proposals. 
Vendors were numerically rated in areas of relevance, experience, and affordability. Using 
multi-dimensional criteria for scoring vendors, we could consistently evaluate vendors and 
quantitatively justify decisions to rate companies RED or GREEN. Relevance measured 
proposals against our desired capability and SOW, experience measured vendor related 
experience that could be leveraged, and affordability evaluated the cost against the value 
outlined in proposal deliverables. See Appendix B for the evaluation rubric.  
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D. TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONS 
Upon completion of the initial proposal review, technology demonstrations were 
requested from the GREEN vendors. This request was separate from the OTA and IWRP 
process and was driven from our desire to evaluate the vendors and existing technology. 
An NSW relevant scenario was generated and distributed to the companies that we 
proceeded with for final proposals. Of the five companies, two agreed to generate and 
present technology demonstrations based on the provided scenario. All companies were 
given a relatively short amount of time, two weeks, to respond to the request. The 
technology demonstration was a purposeful request to help gauge the current technology 
maturity of the virtual interactive environments for each respective vendor.  
 
This image was provided with the permission of the technology proprietor for purposes 
of this academic paper.  
Figure 12. Technology Demonstration Snapshot. Source: Givens (2020). 
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This image was provided with the permission of the technology proprietor for purposes 
of this academic paper.  
Figure 13. Technology Demonstration UAS Snapshot. Source: Givens 
(2020). 
E. FULL PROPOSALS 
We did not have time to fully participate in the evaluation of the Full Proposals 
before this MBA project was due. The proposal process takes approximately two to four 
weeks to complete before awarding a vendor. In an effort to fully document our research, 
this project will be continued by acquisition professionals at WARCOM in coordination 
with current and future NPS students. The continuation of the project and opportunities for 
further research will be discussed in the next chapter. 
F. REVIEW 
In this chapter we discussed the ISE case study and impetus for our project. We 
walked through our partnerships, the vendor space, and our actions as we proceeded 
through the IRWP Consortium to solicit a vendor to fulfill the ISE requirement. In the next 
chapter, we will discuss the benefits of this process and how it may differ from traditional 
FAR based contracting. The next chapter will also provide recommendations for 
continuation of this case study as well as avenues for further research to improve future 
acquisition in NSW. 
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VI. RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
This chapter will discuss the overall experience of the case study as it applies to 
acquisition supporting technology and technology supporting acquisition. We will provide 
our key takeaways from our process and recommendations for future study to improve 
acquisition in NSW.  
A. TRADITIONAL CONTRACT VERSUS OTA PROCESS  
This section will discuss the benefits and weak points of the OTA contracting 
process in our experience from this case study. We will compare this experience with that 
of traditional FAR based contracting to highlight the most significant differences. In our 
experience, the OTA process is much more flexible and allows more agile and frequent 
communication between requirement sponsors and vendors. This benefit provides more 
quality in the formulation of supporting acquisition documents and helps build the 
professional knowledge of all stakeholders involved in the acquisition. OTAs have less 
restrictive contracting rules compared to traditional contracts. With that being said, the 
DOD can use OTAs to fulfill the needs of the warfighter quicker. 
1. Improved Interaction with Industry 
The OTA process flattens communication between the stakeholders in the 
contracting process. This is a key advantage over traditional contracting, especially when 
developing a new capability. To commonly in the government contracting process, industry 
becomes frustrated with the government for not providing enough detail and feedback. 
Government employees are prohibited to give exact product specifications during the RFP 
process leaving vendors guessing and more likely to lose an award because they are not 
meeting the expectations of the government. Contractors and end users are limited in their 
ability to persistently communicate with vendors during the evaluation and selection 
process. This often leads to delays in schedule and sub-optimal delivery of performance of 
the good or service. The OTA process was designed to make acquisition of emerging 
technology and prototypes easier. An employee of a defense contractor agreed to provide 
a statement to capture their perspective on OTAs as opposed to FAR contracting: 
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I’ve worked in the Defense environment for over 30 years and been 
involved in many proposal activities, most of which followed FAR 
processes. I have recently been involved in several Other Transaction 
Authority (OTA) procurements and find them to be very efficient in terms 
of facilitating communication between customers and contractors to identify 
and create solutions. I believe the OTA model provides an agile approach 
to procurement that supports rapid innovation and inclusion of today’s 
rapidly evolving technology. OTAs allow for more efficient responses, 
reducing costs for traditional contractors and reducing the barrier to entry 
for non-traditional contractors. The OTA process is well suited to the rapid 
evolutions that will be needed to maintain a strong defense and ensure that 
our warfighters have the latest technology when they need it. 
—Employee of a Major Defense Contractor 
OTAs provide significant benefits for all stakeholders involved. As representatives 
of the requirement holder, we found OTAs to provide much more control in shaping 
contracting and acquisition. At any point in the contracting process, we were empowered 
to organize question and answer sessions with the vendor as often as we liked. Not only 
did this provide educational opportunity for the vendor to learn more about the desired 
capability and refine their proposals, but as acquisition agents, we were able to learn more 
about different vendors and how to be effective in communicating on behalf of the 
requirement holder. During our correspondence, we were able to develop, test, and refine 
our interaction with vendors. This occurred in identifying key questions to ask in the 
process both about the capability and about the companies experience with OTA 
contracting. In addition, the frequent exposure to industry led to more refined development 
of our desired capability and what was in the realm of possible for near-term and long-term 
iterations of development. 
We never realized ISE was going to draw so much attention from technology 
companies and consulting firms. After the virtual industry day, there were at least eight 
more companies we did one-on-ones with to make sure we maximized the potential number 
of White Papers received. We went from knowing who we wanted to work with, to eleven 
competitors and a preponderance of engagement opportunity. The OTA process provided 
the ability to have frequent and productive interaction with vendors during the contracting 
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process. This benefit led to greater learning by both the requirement sponsor and vendor 
and more refined acquisition documents. 
2. Technology Demonstration Discussion 
Had we been using conventional FAR contracting; we would not have had the 
authority to correspond in new unique ways with potential vendors during the contracting 
process. The OTA process allowed us the flexibility to request technology demonstrations 
from vendors that were competing for the ISE contract award. We found the virtual 
demonstrations of the simulators to be decidedly helpful in down selecting the companies 
prior to and during evaluation of final proposals. The demonstration requests revealed 
varying levels of motivation, willingness, and capacity for each company to provide and 
respond to the desired capability. In addition to the technology maturity, our team was able 
to gauge the proficiency, competency, communication skills, and rapport of the industry 
program managers and subject matter experts. One of the companies that did not provide a 
technology demonstration said it cost too much money to create something in this short of 
a timeframe. When it comes to analyzing the prospective vendors, every detail is important. 
ISE is going to be a long-term agreement between NSW, a vendor and eventually SOCOM.  
As we have learned in graduate school and all of our careers, there is nothing more 
important than knowing your material before presenting it to an audience. In the military, 
if a plan or mission goes exactly as rehearsed, we are lucky. During one of the 
demonstrations, the vendor told us ahead of time to change the scenario on the fly during 
the presentation. They wanted us to be able to see exactly what we would get if we awarded 
them the OTA. We had them modify the ocean sea state to show how a UAS can be 
launched from a RHIB in pitching seas. As seen in Figure 13 in chapter 4, the UAS was 
armed with a hellfire missile. We wanted to see the UAS in action and ordered a strike on 
the enemy gun trucks.  
3. Vendor Selection and Project Status 
There are a few reasons why we do not yet have a vendor on contract, but the main 
reason is time. We started brainstorming the ISE concept with WARCOM in March 2020. 
We reached out to NIWC in regards to IWRP on June 4, 2020. On July 9, 2020, we were 
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put in contact with the IWRP Program Manager and a representative from NIWC-Atlantic. 
Once we submitted our SOW on July 20, we were informed about the consortium process 
and timeline. On August 7, we were informed by NIWC Atlantic that the award date for 
ISE would be in the first quarter of FY21 at the earliest. In an effort to get our project 
awarded as soon as possible, we looked into using the Defense Information Technology 
Contracting Organization’s (DITCO) IDIQ at the end of FY20. They got back to us and 
said we did not meet the criticality threshold for an end-of-year contract action. We decided 
that the IWRP’s OTA seemed to be the best option even in FY21. 
IWRP has three different processing options in which an OTA can be used. Option 
1 is White Paper to Full Proposal: preferred in most cases to maximize feedback at the 
white paper state and then better align SOO, SOW and proposals to government needs. 
Option 1 is the preferred option in most cases even though the white paper does not include 
costing information and they are not intended for use in fourth quarter for end of FY award. 
Option 2 Enhanced White Papers: preferred option to support urgent requirements. This is 
a condensed process where cost information is included in the white papers and can be 
awarded in fourth quarter of the FY. Option 3 Full Proposal: preferred option when NIWC 
has clear requirements in the SOW and wants to limit the period of collaboration. We were 
told to use Option 1 because it allowed the most collaboration with vendors and more 
opportunities to update our SOW and because our requirements were not firm enough to 
go to full proposals. 
Within the three options, there are six stages: Stage 1 Initiation; Stage 2 White 
Paper, Enhanced White Paper; Stage 3 Proposal; Stage 4 Source Selection; Stage 5 
Awards; and Stage 6 Execution & Close-out. Option 1 includes all stages 1–6 and takes 
approximately 14–16 weeks; Option 2, stage 3 is omitted and takes 10–12 weeks; and 
Option 3 omits stage 2 and takes 10–12 weeks. 
If we had the opportunity to begin this project again knowing what we know now, 
we would have begun coordination with IWRP in April, about 2 months earlier than our 
process. We believe that if we had been full time acquisition staff and not also balancing 
the graduate study requirements that we could have awarded a contract in under 14 weeks. 
After speaking to several of presidents from various tech companies, they all agree that 
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they enjoy the OTA process much better than the traditional contracting method. Most of 
the OTAs they won were awarded in 75–90 days versus 250–400 days in a traditional 
contract. 
We believe that the OTA contracting process provided benefits to rapidly develop 
and procure technology in our case study and we think that this process could be completed 
faster provided there is dedicated staff to expedite. In the next section of this chapter we 
will discuss the future concepts for the ISE capability that we helped develop in this case 
study. 
B. FUTURE ISE CONCEPTS 
We believe that procurement of an ISE will provide multi-dimensional benefit for 
NSW. We have discussed how in the short term, ISE can be used as an acquisition tool to 
evaluate new systems and provide meaningful data back to engineers and developers to 
refine and test new prototypes in a low-cost, expedient virtual environment. If our test case 
proves successful, ISE may also open to a variety of other benefits for the NSW 
community.  
Today, ISE can be used to test existing systems and be used to make minor 
adjustments to system parameter and attributes. The next iteration of ISE may provide 
much more in-depth engineering capability for the development of creative solutions. This 
means that a warfighter with little experience in engineering, could ideate, build, and test 
novel solutions in the ISE. ISE would essentially be a low-cost, R&D capability for next 
generation military concepts. Not only could virtual prototypes be built, but they also could 
be tested for fast failure and rapid adaptation. For example, a warfighter imagines a new 
aerial vehicle that could be used in a unique way by NSW. He would then be able to quickly 
access ISE to generate a rudimentary prototype and test the feasibility of that capability. If 
the new idea proves successful, ISE could be utilized to develop new tactics and 
employment concepts for NSW units. ISE empowers any user with the ability to generate 
and test new capability and innovative systems that could potentially benefit the military. 
Why would we not leverage the talent of existing military members to identify and explore 
potential competitive advantages in military application? 
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ISE can also be utilized in an enhanced mission planning capacity. Approval of 
NSW missions heavily depend on the careful planning of briefs called concepts of 
operation (CONOP). Historically, CONOPs are created in PowerPoint with snapshots of 
images garnered from collected intelligence products, satellite imagery, or even open 
sources like Google Earth. Overlayed on the map are phased schemes of movement and 
maneuver of SOF and opposition forces in the mission scenario. Using ISE, this aspect of 
mission planning has the potential to be significantly enhanced. An ISE capability enables 
detailed planning anywhere in the world. Rather than working to communicate plans 
verbally using PowerPoint visual aids, ISE would have the ability to virtually demonstrate 
a tactical plan or scenario to military and civilian leadership.  
Looking further into the future, we believe that ISE could eventually be used to run 
realistic military scenarios and provide wargaming information to the intelligence 
community. By integrating artificial intelligence into enemy forces and the standard 
operating procedures for a SOF unit, or by using military personnel, scenarios could be 
created and run at faster than real time speed. The data that this provides would provide 
value at the tactical level in mission planning as well as data for mission analysis that could 
inform major campaign planning at the operational or strategic level of military planning.  
Like the use of OTAs in contracting, the use of ISE provides significant benefit in 
cutting time and cost to support more agile acquisitions. In addition, ISE has the potential 
to produce new, enhanced capability in mission planning and wargaming. The next section 
of this chapter will discuss what we left out in our case study and provide recommendations 
for continued study. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Project Turnover 
The contract awarding process for ISE is still ongoing during the completion of this 
paper. Since we will not be able to continue analyzing this case study, we will have 
incoming NPS students, with multi-disciplinary related experience, to continue monitoring 
and participating in the development of ISE using the OTA contracting process. The next 
step to be completed is the Proposal Evaluation. Evaluation centers around an assessment 
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of whether technical requirements are satisfied and can be implemented. During this 
evaluation, factors are set and communicated to the consortium with the release of the RPP. 
Each factor is evaluated for a simple statement explaining that the factor has been met, not 
met, or partially met. For a complete outline of the five factors to be evaluated see 
Appendix D. Once the proposals have been evaluated to ensure cost and technical aspects 
are equally weighted, a vendor can be selected for award. Once the vendor has been 
selected, an Information Technology Purchase Request must formally be submitted for 
funding. 
2. Army Overmatch Process Versus Navy OTA Process 
One opportunity for follow-on study is on the differing approaches between Army’s 
acquisition of Operation Overmatch and our acquisition of ISE. These two initiatives could 
be analyzed and compared from conception of the respective systems through their 
termination or successful result. Because we were not able to complete the contracting 
process of this acquisition, we were unable to sufficiently compare the differing contract 
methods in a meaningful way. Possible follow-on studies could address the following 
research questions: 
• Did one contracting process seem to work better for this type of similar 
technological capability? 
• What were the major obstacles for success? Were they similar or 
different? 
• How much of the resident expertise was utilized across the ideation and 
development of this similar technology?  
• Is there weakness in DOD ability to share lesson learned in capability 
acquisition that can be leveraged for future processes? 
• For future iterations of ISE – should we continue to use OTA, or will 
lessons learned influence a different process? How did the vendor 
solicitation process and IWRP consortium affect the performance of 
ISE? 
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3. Other Continued Areas of Study 
Beyond this case study, we can recommend supplemental avenues for further 
research. These topics are related to pursuing improved acquisition in NSW either by 
optimizing the use of OTA in future contracts, alternative contracting vehicles to OTA and 
FAR based contracting processes and leveraging the NPS partnership with acquisition 
professionals in NSW. These topics and possible research opportunities have been included 
below: 
• OTA Optimization—Is there a point in development, or iteration, of a 
capability where OTA would not make as much sense? In this case 
study, we have shown how OTA contracting created a more rapid 
process and enabled superior communication authorization when 
compared to FAR based contracting. OTAs were designed for particular 
use in acquiring emerging technology and prototypes, so would they be 
ineffective past a certain point of development? Perhaps OTAs have 
useful applications in contracting of other types of capability. 
• Contracting Agility—Are there other contracting vehicles, or 
considerations, that create agile contracting for new technology and 
prototype development? In addition to OTAs, what other non-FAR 
based alternative methods exist that could be leveraged in NSW 
acquisition? Are there other significant points of friction in contracting 
that could be analyzed and improved? 
• Academia Partnership in Acquisition—There is a persistent supply of 
graduate students at military universities such as NPS. Is an enduring 
partnership between the MBA students at NPS and acquisition 
professionals at WARCOM worth pursuing further? From the 
WARCOM perspective, are the active duty students well leveraged to 
enhance the progress at WARCOM? How could collaboration with 
other academic specialties benefit NSW? 
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D. SUMMARY 
The Commander at WARCOM wanted to better utilize the students at NPS who 
work in NSW. Students spend several months doing research and writing their thesis to 
only seemingly have the documents lost in the archives of the Dudley Knox Library. We 
were asked to investigate two topics; how can we improve warfighter development within 
NSW and how can we create acquisition agility and flexibility. With manning levels in 
NSW currently capped, finding ways to incorporate new technology is one low-cost way 
we can enhance and improve the warfighters capability in the future. Our ISE project is 
only one area where new technology can provide new capability and increase efficiency of 
current processes. We helped WARCOM N87 develop ISE to test and develop the next 
generation Scan Eagle. By creating a flight simulator that can be analyzed in a virtual 
world, we can refine and test a requirement for unmanned aerial surveillance without 
spending millions of dollars on real prototypes or live testing. ISE could also be used to 
create new weapon systems, water and land vehicles. Students at NPS coming from the 
special operations community should be utilized to develop a wargaming environment that 
allows us to conduct battlefield simulation. 
After a phone call with NIWC-Atlantic, we soon realized that ISE was the perfect 
fit for an OTA. Since we were not considered mission essential, we needed to find the 
fastest acquisition method and make it successful. In our opinion, working with the 
consortium during the past four months has proven more efficient than traditional FAR 
contracting. It has been a steep learning curve but IWRP has been there to help, every step 
of the way. They held virtual training on Microsoft Teams before every milestone to make 
sure the customers understood what to do next.  
A traditional contracting office acts as the middle person between the end user and 
the vendor. In contrast, the OTA process seemed to put more trust on the end user. Instead 
of a contracting officer making the decision of who to award the contract to, our entire 
team gets to vote. We are authorized to communicate with the vendor for clarification on 
anything in the proposal. Unlike FAR contracting, communication with vendors during the 
contracting process was something that we were empowered to do throughout the duration 
of the process and provided significant value to evaluating potential vendors. Developing 
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a rapport with the potential vendor who you are going to work with for the coming years 
is very important. There is a sense of confidence to be gained from having the autonomy 
to communicate and make a more informed decision about how we spend taxpayer dollars. 
Choosing the lowest bidder does not always work in the favor of the government. Often, 
product quality is more important than cheaper solutions.  
Overall, the OTA process went well. If we had been working at WARCOM full 
time on this OTA, we would most likely have a vendor on contract. We were given all the 
responsibility to hold interviews, meet with vendors and work with the consortium but did 
not have power to make the final decision. It is like having your parents tell you to buy 
whatever car you want, but they are paying the bill and will make the final decision. In the 
future, we would do another OTA through one of the consortiums. If we are developing a 
new prototype, the freedom and flexibility of the OTA was less stressful than other 








APPENDIX A. TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION SCENARIO 
SEAL Team THREE (ST3) is off the coast of the Bahamas (or equivalent in size) doing a 
special reconnaissance (SR) mission of a known terrorist network training cell. ST3 is 
launching a Vertical Takeoff and Landing (VTOL) UAS from a Combatant Craft 
Medium (CCM) seven nautical miles off the western coast of the island. 
 
After successful launch of the VTOL from the CCM, the OIC takes control of the UAS 
and starts conducting SR from the southwest tip of the island. Once over the southwest 
part of the island, the camera feed picks up four jeeps, two of them have mounted .50’s. 
There is a total of 13 troops on the ground, 10 of them are carrying AK-47’s. They appear 
to be conducting range operations. 
 
Just north of the four jeeps, is a small watch tower with two armed snipers not paying 
attention to anything. The tower appears to be surrounded by razor wire and sandbags. 
There is a crew served weapon at the base of the tower covered by sniper hide netting. 
 
North of the guard tower is a small harbor with two small docks and two larger docks. 
There are four 11-meter rigged hull inflatable boat RHIB’s parked at the smaller docks 
and three larger gun boats tied up to the large docks. There appears to be one gunboat 
missing from a slip. The harbor contains 10 buildings and is surrounded by razor wire 
and sandbags. The entry control point (ECP) is guarded by two main towers, a swing 
gate, and two crew served .50’s. There are roughly 50 troops who appear to be in training 
and another 30 around the compound. Also, inside the compound is a small obstacle 
course.  
 
Northwest of the harbor/compound is another guard tower set up very similar to the one 
in the south. Two guards in the tower with sniper rifles and two more are near a .50 cal.  
 
As the drone is completing its flight, the OIC notices the missing gunboat from the harbor 
heading in the direction of the CCM. The CCM must take evasive action and head away 
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APPENDIX B. VENDOR EVALUATION RUBRIC 
We developed an evaluation rubric to objectively assess vendors’ proposals. 
Vendors were numerically rated in areas of relevance, experience, and affordability. Using 
multi-dimensional criteria for scoring vendors, we could consistently evaluate vendors and 
quantitatively justify decisions to rate companies RED or GREEN. Relevance measured 
proposals against our desired capability and SOW, experience measured vendor related 
experience that could be leveraged, and affordability evaluated the cost against the value 
outlined in proposal deliverables. Our rubric can be viewed in Figure 14.  
 
Figure 14. Vendor Proposal Rubric 
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APPENDIX C. STATEMENT OF WORK (SOW) 
STATEMENT OF WORK 
 




Other Transaction Agreement # N65236-18-9-0001 
 
Proposal number:  [ Unique ID number from IWRP PM] 
Awardee:  [IWRP Member Company Name] 
Title: Interactive Synthetic Environment (ISE) for Warfighting Development 
Place of 
Performance: Contractor Facility and remotely 
Period of 




In December 2019, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Naval Special Warfare (NSW) 
Chair started formulating the concept for an Interactive Synthetic Environment (ISE) for 
Warfighting Development. The initial vision was to explore two primary objectives: 
• Man-Unmanned Aircraft System interface during a Special Reconnaissance 
mission 
• UAS operating capabilities and characteristics based on mission objectives 
By February 2020, basic goals and objectives were codified further and interaction 
began with the Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) as these goals where aligned 
with the developing Multi-Mission Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems (MTUAS) program 
(i.e. ScanEagle follow-on). Embracing the Design Thinking methodology—a highly 
adaptive and iterative approach—enabled NPS and NSWC teams to refine the ISE 
requirements to meet both commands’ goals and objectives.  
While the initial Minimal Viable Product (MVP)1 v1.0 is focused on a specific SR mission 
and selected UAS platforms, it is envisioned that the interactive synthetic environment 
developed will be extensible to incorporate other missions, operating environments 
(across all domains), platforms, equipment, players, and data analytics leveraging hyper-
scale cloud technologies 
 
 
1 Minimal Viable Product (MVP) – “that version of a new product which allows a team to collect the maximum 
amount of validated learning about customers with the least effort.” from The Lean Startup by Eric Ries, 2011. 
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The Interactive Synthetic Environment (ISE) for Warfighting Development is an emerging 
technology development initiative to produce a MVP prototype mission simulation 
environment that can rapidly run mission scenarios resulting in a better understanding 
of the potential operating environment and how to best employ mission resources.  
 
The first ISE MVP scenario is to develop a Special Reconnaissance (SR) mission 
commencing from a Combatant Craft Medium (CCM) at sea. The CCM crew will launch 
an Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) which will fly to and conduct reconnaissance of a 
target and then the UAS will be recovered by the CCM. 
It is envisioned that the ISE MVP v1.0 prototype will run the synthetic mission 
environment on a robust Windows 10 gaming personal computer (PC) with future 
intentions of leveraging the benefits of the hyperscale cloud. ISE will be accessed via an 
icon from the desktop to launch the simulation. ISE will provide three basic functions: 
• Build scenario 
• Run scenario 
• Replay and analyze results 
After being welcomed to the ISE environment with a brief description of the SR mission, 
the operator will begin by building the scenario with environmental, and mission 
options. Next the operator runs the game, which will provide a visually rendered 
mission executed in the synthetic environment following preset parameters and the 
variables selected by the operator. High fidelity rendering of the UAS launch and 
recovery from the CCM and the selected target is desired primarily from a birds-eye 
view. MVP v1.0 will have the capability to record data from each mission run for 
playback and analysis. It’s envisioned that the simulation will run at an accelerated rate 
since the real-time mission is expected to run 8–12 hours. 
The long-term goal of the ISE initiative (beyond MVP v1.0) is to provide a synthetic 
environment in which any warfighting resource can be rapidly and accurately tested in 
various operating environments and multiple mission profiles to aide procurement 
selection decisions and inform tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), especially for 
autonomous systems. Additionally, it is envisaged that the synthetic environment could 
even be used to rapidly model a real-world environment in support of mission planning. 
The ISE prototype must serve operators, program managers, resource sponsors, NPS faculty and 
students, and DOD partners responsible for rapid prototyping and manufacturing. Key benefits 
include improved insights for doctrine and TTP development, increased mission success, 
reduced cost, and shorter development timelines. 
 
2.0 Scope/Initiative Objective:  
 
As mentioned above, during the build scenario the operator will be presented with 
environmental and mission profile options. From the “Environment Panel” the operator 
will be able to select: 
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• Season (spring, summer, autumn, or winter) 
• Location (San Clemente Island, CA) 
• Weather conditions (clear, cloudy, precipitation, fog, haze, dust) 
• Time of day (day or night)  
• Temperature (cold, warm, or hot) 
• Wind speed (0, 10, 20, or 25 knots) 
• Wind direction (north, east, south, west) 
• Sea state scale (0 to 9) 
• Global Positioning System (GPS) denied (yes or no) 
• Command & Control (C2) denied (yes or no) 
 
From the “Mission Panel” the operator will be able to select: 
• Target type (underground facility, missile site, naval base) 
• CCM distance from shore (e.g. 12–25 nm) 
• UAS platform (limited to one Vertical Takeoff & Landing (VTOL) 
• Sensors (day/night cameras, infrared camera) 
• Payload; number of quadcopters (1 to 4) 
• Altitude (2,000, 4,000, 8,000 feet) 
• Speed (40 or 75 knots indicated airspeed) 
• Course (straight line or up to 5 waypoints) 
• Endurance (4, 8, or 12 hours) 
• Navigation/line of sight (yes or no) 
• Survivability (high, medium, or low) 
• Detectability (acoustic, radar, or IR) 
• Collection success (100, 75, 50, 25, or 0 percent) 
• Metadata (UAS location, true north compass, center field of view location, target 
range, slant angle, and time stamp) 
• UAS system logs (aircraft, propulsion, and GCS critical parameters) 
 
Three dimensional (3D) models and operating characteristics and profiles of UAS 
platforms will be provided by selected manufacturers leveraging standard Computer 
Aided Design (CAD) or 3D modeling tools (or as an additional CLIN, the prime contractor 
will create the 3D model for use in ISE). MVP v1.0 will be limited to one UAS platform. 
ISE will leverage flight simulation tools that will be configurable for the various air 
vehicle configurations to accurately model UAS flight dynamics and performance. 
Additional air simulation (AirSim) tools may be leveraged in the future for collection and 
exploration of artificial intelligence (AI), Machine Learning (ML), and Reinforced 





3.0 References/Specifications:  
Section Document Title Document Date 
4.1 Mi2 Request for System Performance Summary June 2020 
   
4.3 Education for Seapower February 2019 
   
   
4.6 Rand: Next Generation Wargaming for the U.S. 
Marine Corps 
2019 
4.7 Representative Military Users/Operators 




4.0 Requirements:  
 
The overall objective for the ISE prototype is to provide v1.0 of a dynamic, interactive 
synthetic environment for modeling and simulation of UAS capabilities in support of a 
Special Reconnaissance mission. The ISE prototype will enable operators, project 
management offices (PMOs), faculty, and students a simulated digital environment to 
test emerging technologies capabilities via a SR mission. Furthermore, an additional 
objective is to ensure the interactive synthetic environment is extensible to easily 
incorporate future missions, resources, equipment, variables, geo-locations, and 
environmental fidelity.  
A Design Thinking and Agile Development approach is expected--providing the awardee 
continuing collaborative access to stakeholders and representative users, including NPS, 
NSWC, UAS manufacturers, and other Department of Defense units relevant to the 
mission. The government intends to allow the awardee(s) maximum flexibility to use 
their respective commercial/industry best practices (e.g., methodology details, tool sets, 
and sprint cycle time, etc.). The government envisions the following MVP v1.0 
requirements (Set of Stated Objectives) to be refined and clarified by stakeholder 
dynamic and continuous interaction with awardee(s) at the kickoff meeting and 
subsequent interactions/ milestones with the agile development team.  
4.1 Technical Requirements: 
4.1.1 Selection of industry-leading simulation platform. 
4.1.2 Selection of an open and advanced 3D engine and associated editor for 
runtime environment. 
4.1.3 Selection of UAS flight simulation tools, including flight planning. 
4.1.4 ISE will run on DOD standard operating system Windows 10. 
4.1.5 Produce PDF storyboard of the ISE scenario. 
4.1.6 Produce a MP4 video trailer of the storyboard (optional CLIN). 
4.1.7 Develop user interface/experience (UI/UX). 
4.1.8 Create or ingest 3D model of Naval CCM. 
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4.1.9 Create or ingest 3D model of a single UAS  
4.1.10 Build Scenario: 
4.1.10.1 Create synthetic environment with selection options outlined 
in section 3.0. 
4.1.10.2 Determine and create fidelity of launch and recovery from 
CCM and target site. 
4.1.10.3 Determine and create gameplay geo-box around San 
Clemente Island, CA. 
4.1.10.4 Leverage imagery and terrain data from San Clemente Island, 
CA. 
4.1.10.5 Determine and create specific targets (up to three). 
4.1.10.6 Determine and create environmental effects for three 
locations: UAS launch from CCM; target site; and UAS recovery 
on CCM. 
4.1.10.7 Determine and create adversary threat (up to three types, 
e.g., radar, Surface to Air Missile (SAM), mine field). 
4.1.10.8 Determine flight path (straight line or up to 12 waypoints). 
4.1.10.9 Determine and create non player characters required (NPCs) 
(optional CLIN). 
4.1.10.9.1 Determine and create what additional actors/
entities would need to be injected into the scenario 
(optional CLIN). 
4.1.10.9.2 Determine if NPCs need to be controlled or 
programmed (optional CLIN). 
4.1.11 Run scenario: 
4.1.11.1 Integrate and run CCM and UAS in synthetic environment. 
4.1.11.2 Determine and create views as operator executes Special 
Reconnaissance mission, (e.g., bird’s eye view). 
4.1.11.3 Determine flight model accuracy. 
4.1.11.3.1 Sub-system modeling or simulation  
4.1.11.3.1.1 Electrical 
4.1.11.3.1.2 Flight controls 
4.1.11.3.1.3 Sensor packages 
4.1.11.3.1.4 Communications 
4.1.11.3.1.5 Propulsion 
4.1.11.3.1.6 Flight Management System 
4.1.11.3.1.7 Ground Control Systems 
4.1.11.4 Determine and create UAS sensors requirements. 
4.1.11.4.1 Types of sensors (FMV EO and IR, LRF, LP). 
4.1.11.4.2 For a given sensor, especially visual, the system is 
not required to capture actual sensor output data.  
4.1.11.5 Sensor data collection success will be determined by various 
factors including how close the sensor was to target, weather 
conditions, terrain, or other factors that could cause 
degradation or visual blanking  
4.1.12 Replay and analyze results:  
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4.1.12.1 A replay capability is required for post-simulation analysis. 
Since a mission may be run at accelerated time, the system 
needs to provide a method to play-back various segments of the 
mission, and identify where issues may have been encountered. 
This can entail non-capture of sensor data, air vehicle faults, 
encounters with various Red Team entities or other issues 
impacting the mission. Typical views can include a Bird’s eye of 
the mission, mission track, or the ability to move camera around 
the principal hero actor.  
4.1.12.2 The following UAS systems outputs can be used to reconstruct 
the mission and should be available for viewing in replay.  
4.1.12.2.1 GPS location 




4.1.12.3 Show located targets or other entities on a map.  
4.1.12.4 Other post-mission output is TBD.  
4.1.13 Develop with an extensibility vision for emerging technology areas such 
as Hyper-Scale, Hybrid Cloud enablement; Cloud Cognitive Services; 
Synthetic Data Generation; Automated Machine Learning (ML); 
Reinforcement Learning (RL); Artificial Intelligence (AI); Hypothesis 
Generation and Validation; Temporal Reasoning; Predictive Modeling; 
and simulation capabilities such as Synthetics-for-Computing Vision, 
Synthetics for Satellite Imagery, and Synthetics for RF. 
4.2 Testing Requirements: 
4.2.1 Software and integration testing on all software components and 
services to commercial best practices to deliver stable prototype. 
4.2.2 Verify functionality and integrity of ISE running on specified computer 
operating system. 
4.2.3 Verify functionality and integrity of features supporting CCM and UAS 
3D models into synthetic environment. 
4.2.4 Verify functionality and integrity of features supporting Operators and 
Military Users, with government representative. 
 
4.3 Logistics Requirements: 
4.3.1 Any software licensing must be identified as soon as appropriate. 
4.3.2 Any hardware requirements must be identified as soon as appropriate. 
4.4 Other Requirements:  
4.4.1 Industry expertise in hyper-scale cloud, Triple-A gaming, full-service 
game studios, cognitive services, and significant AI/ML research and 
deployment. 
4.4.2 The ISE will support the Combat Evaluation (CV) process. The purpose of 
the CV is to rapidly assess a potential solution through the evaluation of 
a limited number of assets in an operationally representative 
environment informed by SOF Operator feedback. CVs can be used as a 
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risk reduction and/or an opportunity exploitation tool for the program 
to pursue, for example, an increase in technology, inform the requiring 
activity about the Technology Readiness/ Manufacturing Readiness 




5.0 Milestone and Deliverables Schedule: 
 
 Milestone  Due Date Cost  
 Award Date TBD  
5.1 Technical Approach Validation  $XX,XXX 
 Deliverable Task 
Reference Data Rights 
  
5.1.1 Prototype Project 
Plan 
4.1-4.4 Unlimited   
5.1.2 Testing and 
Quality Control 
Plan 
4.2 Unlimited   
5.2 Technical Capability Demonstration  $XX,XXX 
 Deliverable Task 
Reference Data Rights 
  
5.2.1 1st Quarterly 
Capability 
Demonstration 
4.1 Unlimited 90 days after 
award 
 
5.2.3 Sprint Wrap-Ups 4.1 Unlimited TBD  
5.2.4 2nd Quarterly 
Capability 
Demonstration 




5.2.5 Sprint Wrap-Ups 4.1 Unlimited TBD  
5.2.6 3rd Quarterly 
Capability 
Demonstration 
4.1 Unlimited 270 days after 
award 
 
5.2.7 Sprint Wrap-Ups 4.1 Unlimited TBD  
5.2.8 GovCloud 
Deployment 
4.1 Unlimited TBD  
5.3 Final Prototype & 
Testing 
   $XX,XXX 
 Deliverable Task 
Reference Data Rights 
  
5.3.1 Final report of ESP 
Capabilities and 
Testing Results 




5.4 Monthly Status Reports  $XX,XXX 
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 Milestone  Due Date Cost  
 Deliverable Task 
Reference Data Rights 
  




5.5 Determination of Successful Prototype 
(Should be no cost to the Government) 
 $XX,XXX 
 Deliverable Task Reference Data Rights 
  
















5.5.3 Roadmap for 
projected work for 










5.6 Quarterly Technical and Business Status Reports  $XX,XXX 
 Deliverable Task Reference Data Rights 
  
5.6.1 Quarterly Technical 
and Business Status 
Reports 
6.1 GPR Quarterly  
5.7 Final Technical & Business Status Report  $XX,XXX 
 Deliverable Task Reference Data Rights 
  
5.7.1 Final Technical 
Report 
4.1.10, 6.2 GPR End of PoP  
Grand Total $XX,XXX,XXX 
Total Period of Performance XX Months 
Contract Type FFP/CPFF 
IWRP Member: Use table above OR use this table if cost sharing is done. 
 
 






 Award Date TBD   
5.1 Technical Approach Validation  $XX,XXX $XX,XXX 
 Deliverable Task 
Reference Data Rights 
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5.1.1 Prototype Project 
Plan 
4.1-4.4 Unlimited    
5.1.2 Testing and 
Quality Control 
Plan 
4.2 Unlimited    
5.2 Technical Capability Demonstration  $XX,XXX $XX,XXX 
 Deliverable Task 
Reference Data Rights 
   
5.2.1 1st Quarterly 
Capability 
Demonstration 
4.1 Unlimited 90 days after 
award 
  
5.2.2 Sprint Wrap-Ups 4.1 Unlimited TBD   
5.2.3 2nd Quarterly 
Capability 
Demonstration 





5.2.4 Sprint Wrap-Ups 4.1 Unlimited TBD   
5.2.5 3rd Quarterly 
Capability 
Demonstration 
4.1 Unlimited 270 days 
after award 
  
5.2.6 Sprint Wrap-Ups 4.1 Unlimited TBD   
5.2.7 GovCloud 
Deployment 
4.1 Unlimited TBD   
5.3 Final Prototype 
& Testing 
   $XX,XXX $XX,XXX 
 Deliverable Task 
Reference Data Rights 
   









5.4 Monthly Status Reports  $XX,XXX $XX,XXX 
 Deliverable Task 
Reference Data Rights 
   





5.5 Determination of Successful Prototype 
(Should be no cost to the Government) 
 $XX,XXX $XX,XXX 
 Deliverable Task 
Reference Data Rights 
   


























5.5.3 Roadmap for 
projected work 













5.11 Quarterly Technical and Business Status 
Reports 
 $XX,XXX  
 Deliverable Task 
Reference Data Rights 





6.1 GPR Quarterly   
5.12 Final Technical Report  $XX,XXX  
 Deliverable Task 
Reference Data Rights 
   
5.12.1 Final Technical 
Report 
4.1.10, 6.2 GPR End of PoP   
Total Cost Shares $XX,XXX $XX,XXX 
Grand Total $XX,XXX,XXX 
Total Period of Performance XX Months 
Contract Type Cost Share 
 
 
6.0 Delivery Method: 
Deliverables shall be sent to the following government point of contact: 
Receiving Officer: [To be filled in before submission] 
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7.0 Data and Reporting: 
 
7.1 Periodic Reports: The contractor shall prepare a Periodic Status Report which 
will include a Business Status section and a Technical Status section in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of the OTA Base Agreement or as 
modified by the Contract Officer’s Representative (COR). For the projects that 
are 4–6 months, the periodic reports will be at least monthly. For any project 
over 6 months, the periodic reports will be quarterly. 
 
7.2 Final Business/Technical Report: At the completion of the initiative, the 
contractor shall submit a Final Business/Technical Report, which will provide a 
comprehensive, cumulative, and substantive summary of the progress and 
significant accomplishments achieved during the total period of performance 
(POP) and provide summarized details of the business resource status of the 




8.0 Patents, Data Rights and Copyrights:  
 
Desire Government Purpose Rights (GPR) for software and documentation for 




The security classification level for this initial MVP v1.0 effort is UNCLASSIFIED. 
 





Depending on the success of the ISE prototype with the military user community, the 
sponsor anticipates the desire to transition this ISE prototyping effort to production 
using OTA transition mechanisms. If the prototype project is successful (as determined 
by achieving the milestone for determination of success) the effort may transition to 
fielding and / or production with the following deliverables required: 
 
11.1 ISE prototype software and services O&M 
11.2 ISE prototype (digital) Users’ Manual  
11.3 Roadmap for projected work for ISE prototype to meet anticipated production 
quality product delivery 
 
All information above is part of Phase I. The information below refers to future options Phase II 
and Phase III. 
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Multiple options and variations for the flight profiles are envisioned, but recommended 
for MVP v2.0, (Phase II) including but not limited to: variations in air vehicle properties 
(physical and flight dynamics updates), flight plan development, manual flight mode, 
increased environmental fidelity, larger geo-areas, longer distances to the target, etc. 
Additionally, comprehensive data capture and use of the resulting data sets for 
enhanced wargame analysis including Cognitive Services, AI, ML, and RL are out of scope 
for MVP v1.0. 
 
The long-term goal of the ISE initiative (Phase II and Phase III) is to provide a synthetic 
environment in which any warfighting resource can be rapidly and accurately tested in 
various operating environments and multiple mission profiles to aide procurement 
selection decisions and inform mission tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), 
especially for autonomous systems. It is foreseen that in the near future the synthetic 
environment could be leveraged to rapidly model real-world environments in support of 
mission planning. 
 
12.0 Agreements Officer representative (AOR) Info: 
Agreements Officer Representative (AOR) Contact Info: [To be filled in before submission] 
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APPENDIX D. CODED VENDOR LIST 
This list is provided to give the reader a sense of the vendor space that was explored 
throughout this case study. We have provided an anonymous list of the companies that 
showed interest during the IWRP industry day and submitted an initial white paper 
proposal. Names of companies have been redacted due to the ongoing contract awarding 
process. 
 
1. A small, privately held analytics and software engineering company that provides 
software development and information engineering solutions to customers in 
government and private industry. Focus areas are in Data Fusion, Software 
Engineering, Predictive Analytics, Text Analysis, Simulation, Tracking, 
Optimization, Cybersecurity, Visualization, and Software Engineering. 
Employees: 50–200 
2. A privately held, high-tech small business focusing on software and hardware 
system integration. Employees: Unknown 
3. A mid-size company that provides engineering services. The company offers 
information, communications, electronic warfare, simulation, training, and 
instrumentation systems. Employees: Unknown 
4. This large, global technology company focuses on intelligent infrastructure for 
buildings and decentralized energy systems, on automation and digitalization in 
the process and manufacturing industries, and on smart mobility solutions for rail 
and road transport. Employees: 385,000 
5. Large American multinational technology that develops, manufactures, licenses, 
supports, and sells computer software, consumer electronics, personal computers, 
and related services. Areas of focus are in Software Development, Computer 
Hardware, Consumer Electronics, Cloud Computing, Video Games. Employees: 
163,000 
6. A mid-size subsidiary of a major government contracting company that is one of 
the world’s largest suppliers of aerospace and defense products. Areas of focus 
are in aerospace. Employees: 78,000 
7. A mid-size American technology company, defense contractor and information 
technology services provider that produces C6ISR systems and products, wireless 
equipment, tactical radios, avionics and electronic systems, night vision 
equipment, and both terrestrial and spaceborne antennas for use in the 
government, defense, and commercial sectors. They specialize in surveillance 
solutions, microwave weaponry, and electronic warfare. Employees: 50,000 
8. A small business focused on applied technology, simulation software, robotics, 
and data science that provide solutions for DOD and NASA. Employees: 
Unknown 
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9. A small, employee-owned company that offers service in engineering, application 
development, modeling and simulation based training, spatial analysis, and 
technical trained development. Employees: 400  
10. A mid-size information technology company focused on serving DOD and 
intelligence agencies with C4ISR and cyber. Engineering services, enterprise IT, 
mission support. Employees: 23,000 
11. A small, employee-owned technology for DOD, intelligence agencies, and 
defense contracting companies. The focus areas are in applied mathematics, 
statistical inference, operations research, physical modeling, signal processing, 
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